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ABSTRACT
Coherentist  theories  of  justification  face  the  Sensation  objection,  according  to  which  some 
experiences,  such  as  that  of  a  headache,  independently  justify  us  in  holding  certain  beliefs 
regardless of whether they cohere with the rest of our beliefs. Since coherentism holds that our 
beliefs are justified only on the basis of coherence with the rest of our beliefs, coherentism is, or so 
it has been argued, false. But the Sensation objection fails. First of all,  there is no independent  
justification going on in these cases. And second, a variant of BonJour's theory of introspection can 
make sense of these cases within a pure coherentist position. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Suppose you feel a persistent and throbbing pain in your head, and that you on the basis of this 
experience come to believe that you have a headache. However, for some reason, this belief does 
not fit together, or cohere, with the rest of your beliefs. You believe many things, but none of them 
support the belief that you have a headache. You have drinken enough water, you suffer from no 
illness, and you have recently taken an aspirin. Are you still justified in believing that you have a 
headache? It seems you are. But why is this so? One possible answer is that some of your beliefs, 
including the belief that you have a headache, are justified to you on their own, or independently 
justified, because of your having certain sensations or experiences.
One task of epistemology is to decide what makes a belief count as justified. Coherentist theories 
of justification claim that for you to be justified in holding a belief, it is necessary and sufficient that 
this belief coheres with the rest of your beliefs. But in the case of your headache, you seem justified 
in holding this belief even if it does not cohere with the rest of your beliefs. And so coherentism 
must be false. Call this objection to coherentism the "Sensation objection".1 It is the aim of this 
paper to examine whether and to which degree this objection is successful.
The  paper  is  dispositioned  as  follows.  Section  two  introduces  the  debate  on  epistemic 
justification and the subsequent rationale for accepting a coherentist position. Section three presents 
the Sensation objection and outlines two specific ways in which this objection supposedly refutes 
coherentism. Section four considers a psychological reply according to which certain experiences 
by necessity bring about certain beliefs. This reply fails to save coherentism, since we can always 
imagine situations where the experiences fail to induce such beliefs, and since even when they do, 
coherence may still be insufficient for justification. Section five suggests another reply, namely that 
our  beliefs,  to  the extent  that  they are justified,  are  always justified in  the context  of a  set  of 
background beliefs. Because of this, there is no independent  justification going on in these cases. 
This  insight  leads to section six and seven,  in which we consider  how a particular  account  of 
coherence, namely that of BonJour's coherence theory of introspection, answers the objection. 
1 This objection has been suggested by Earl  Conee under the label “The Sensational Objection” in “Isolation and 
Beyond”,  Philosophical  Topics  23 (1995), 129-46,  at  138-43;  and  Ernest  Sosa,  “The  Raft  and  the  Pyramid: 
Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), 3-26, at 18-
20.  Similar  arguments  have  been  made  by  Stephen  E.  Rosenbaum,  “Reviving  the  Isolation  Argument”, 
Philosophical Studies 48 (1985), 241-8; and John L. Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), 28.
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2.  COHERENTIST THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION
In what follows, we deal with a certain branch of epistemology, namely that of how our beliefs are 
justified. This  is  a  normative rather  than descriptive question:  we ask not  of the psychological 
processes of how we come to hold certain beliefs, nor of any sociological account of why we think 
of them as justified. Rather, we want to know under what circumstances we ought to count beliefs  
as justified, regardless of whether we actually think of them as justified or not. 
Epistemological theories  of  justification  differ  from  metaphysical theories  of  truth  or  the 
ontological status of the world. Such metaphysical theories try to explain what makes a proposition 
true  or  false  or  whether  the world exists  independently of  our  minds.  Which answers  to  these 
metaphysical questions are correct has some epistemological relevance. Strictly speaking, however, 
most metaphysical theories should be logically compatible with most epistemological theories of 
justification. In what follows, I say nothing of these matters, but simply take as my starting point a 
so called realist ontology, according to which there exists a mind-independent world; as well as a 
correspondence theory of  truth,  which  is  the view that  empirical  propositions  are  true  or  false 
depending upon their corresponding to this world. 
Theories of justification must be distinguished from theories of methodology in epistemological 
inquiry: that is, justificatory theories differ from theories about what we should and can do in order 
to reach true or justified beliefs.2 Which methodological theories are correct is sure to depend upon 
some interesting empirical facts about biology, psychology, sociology, and perhaps even politics. In 
what follows, I leave aside the difficult question of which such methods we should employ. To 
avoid sliding imperceptibly from justificatory issues to methodological ones, I shall consider the 
person's system of beliefs as fixed, rather than as in a state of development or flux.
When  trying  to  decide  which  theory  of  justification  is  correct,  we  may  ask  two  different 
questions.3 First,  we may want  to know whether a belief  is justified,  regardless of whether the 
person has any chance of knowing whether it is so justified or not. In that case, we are most likely 
inclined to accept an externalist theory of justification, according to which the reasons for counting 
a person's belief as justified may be wholly exterior to her. In that case, the person need never know 
that she is justified in holding a particular belief. Second, we may want to know whether the person 
herself is justified in holding a particular belief. We then assess her actions and behaviour as a 
responsible epistemic agent. In this case, we are most likely inclined towards some internalist view, 
2 Robert  Stern  makes  this  distinction  admirably  clear  in  his  "Coherence  as  a  Test  for  Truth",  Philosophy  and 
Phenomenological Research 69 (2004), 296-326.
3 See Kent Bach, “A Rationale for Reliabilism”, The Monist 68 (1985), 246-63, at 246-53.
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according to which the reasons constituting the justification of a belief must be accessible to the 
believer herself. In what follows, it is this second question which I am concerned with, and I shall 
assume that an internalist view of justification is correct. 
Let us focus on this second sense of justification. Suppose that you hold a number of different 
beliefs. Which theory of justification can best account for which beliefs you are and are not justified 
in holding?
Perhaps we think that each belief is justified from it being inferred from other justified beliefs. 
For example, your belief that you bought food in the store is justified because you are justified in  
believing (a) that you have a receipt in your hands, (b) that you now have twenty dollars less in your 
pocket, and (c) that you remember buying food, and so on. But this raises the question of what 
makes these other beliefs justified. Presumably they must be justified by appeals to other justified 
beliefs. But, to repeat ourselves, what makes these further beliefs justified? Each belief summoned 
to confer justification thus seems to require its own justification in turn, resulting in an infinitely 
long chain of beliefs, each supporting the other. But surely it is implausible that our beliefs should 
be justified through such an infinitely long chain of beliefs. In particular, it seems impossible for 
any living person to hold an infinite number of beliefs. This is commonly known as the Regress 
problem. 
The most natural solution to the Regress problem is to adopt foundationalism. Foundationalists 
agree that a portion of our beliefs are justified inferentially, as in the case of your trip to the grocery 
store. But they also claim that some beliefs are justified  non-inferentially.  These beliefs are of a 
"basic" kind such that they confer justification without receiving justification from other beliefs in 
turn. Foundationalists therefore has an initially plausible reply to the Regress problem. But while 
historically speaking, foundationalism has been the dominant alternative, it is now in decline. Why 
is this so?
The difficulties of foundationalism pertains to the challenge of specifying the status of the basic 
beliefs; that is, of the beliefs intended to confer justification without being justified in turn, or of the 
unjustified justifiers. One problem is to decide which of our beliefs are basic. H. H. Price suggested 
that beliefs about our own experiences are "given" to us and thus basic in the required sense.4 Price 
exemplifies with the case of watching a red tomato. While there are many things about the tomato 
which we may doubt, such as whether it is real or hallucinated, there is one thing which we cannot 
doubt,  namely the fact  that  we directly  experience  the  tomato in  the sense  of  experiencing its 
4 H. H. Price, “The Given”, Knowledge, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009 [2009]), 235-44.
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redness, shape, smell and so on. Introspective beliefs, or beliefs about our own experiences, are 
therefore  plausible  candidates  for  being  non-inferential  and  basic  in  the  sense  required  by 
foundationalism.
So far so good. But foundationalism suffers from the following dilemma.5 For what is the status 
of the experiences which justifies our basic  beliefs? It  seems as if  these experiences are  either 
propositional in nature, or they are not. In other words, either they are experiences that something is 
the case, or merely experiences of something. In the case of their being propositional it is clear how 
they can confer justification to our basic beliefs. If Mary experiences that there is a car infront of 
her it is easy to see how this experience could justify her in believing that there is such a car. But if 
experiences  are  propositional  they  stand in  need of  further  justification.  They cannot  therefore 
provide the kind of basic justification necessary for foundationalism. 
On the  other  hand,  if  the  experiences  are  not  propositional  in  nature,  they  need  no further 
justification, but then neither do they confer justification to basic beliefs. Let us illustrate this with 
the following example. Suppose that Mary and a small child stands infront of a car. Both have the 
same experience  of the  car:  they have the same phenomenological  impression of  the  tires,  the 
windscreen and so on. But since the child does not know what a car is, she does not experience that 
there is a car. The problem is that the same experience might give rise to numerous different and 
incompatible beliefs. Because of this, an experience of something does not by itself justify a belief 
that something is the case.
Coherentism provides an alternative to foundationalism and solves the Regress problem without 
supposing the existence of any basic beliefs. According to coherentism, the justification of a belief 
depends upon its coherence, or its fitting together, with the rest of the person's system of beliefs, or 
with some sufficiently large subsystem of her beliefs. Instead of justification of a belief depending 
upon it being inferred from other justified beliefs, its justification instead derives from it cohering 
with  the person's  other  beliefs,  where  this  system of  beliefs  is  coherent  to  a  sufficient  degree. 
Coherentist justification is therefore of a holistic nature, where the beliefs are mutually supportive 
in a "web of belief" rather than simply conferring justification in one-way chains of beliefs. If 
coherentism is successful, the Regress problem is solved, since we need no longer find a specific 
point where the regress terminates, nor to suppose an infinitely long chain of beliefs.6
5 This dilemma is often attributed to Wilfred Sellars. See, for example, his Science, Perception and Reality (London, 
Aylesbury: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1968 [1963]), 164-70.
6 See Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
87-93.
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I provide a more detailed formulation of a specific theory of coherentism later on. For now, it is 
enough to note that I deal only with "pure" coherence theories. That is, I limit myself to theories 
which hold that coherence among a person's beliefs is both necessary and sufficient for justification. 
On such theories, a person's beliefs brings with them no independent support, or support on their 
own, but their justification stems instead entirely from the extent to which they cohere with the rest 
of her beliefs. It is this drastic claim on the coherentist's part that makes the Sensation objection 
possible. 
3.  THE SENSATION OBJECTION
Before  we  discuss  the  Sensation  objection,  we  must  distinguish  it  from  the  objection  that 
coherentism is not truth-conducive. According to this objection, coherentism is problematic because 
the coherence of a system of beliefs makes it no more likely that its constituent beliefs are  true. 
Informally,  this  is  shown  by  considering  everyday  cases  in  which  persons  are  deluded  about 
features of the world even as their total systems of beliefs are coherent, such as in the case of an 
asylum inmate who believes  he is  Napoleon,  but  where this  belief  coheres well  with his  other 
equally  false  beliefs.  Formally,  this  result  has  been  proven  within  the  framework of  Bayesian 
probability theory.7 It is claimed that since a theory of justification must aim for truth, and since 
coherentism  cannot  guarantee  the  truth  of  our  beliefs  solely  on  the  basis  of  their  coherence, 
coherentism is unacceptable. 
If  coherentism is  not  truth-conducive,  its  success  as  a  theory  of  justification  depends  upon 
whether  there is  a competing theory which is  better  off,  either  because such a  theory is  truth-
conducive, or because it has some other advantage. I am sceptical that there exists such a theory, 
partly because I do not see how any internalist theory can guarantee truth-conduciveness. But in any 
case,  if  coherentism  is  refuted,  it  must  be  refuted  for  the  right  reasons.  Precisely  because 
coherentism suffers from heavy criticism in the contemporary debate, we must be careful about 
which objections goes through. As I shall argue, the Sensation objection gives us no reason to reject 
coherentism, regardless of whether some other objection is successful.
The  rationale  for  this  paper  therefore  depends  upon  whether  the  Sensation  objection  is 
independent from the objection that coherentism is not truth-conducive. But this is clearly the case. 
Imagine, for example, the possible world where, whenever a person holds a coherent system of 
beliefs, all beliefs in this system happen to be true. In such a world, the presence of coherence 
7 For the formal argument, see Erik Olsson's Against Coherence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 61-76.
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among a person's beliefs guarantees their truth: coherentism is truth-conducive. But in this world, a 
person who holds an incoherent system of beliefs and who feels a sudden pain in her head seems to 
be  justified  in  believing  that  she  has  a  headache  even  if  this  belief  does  not,  because  of  the 
incoherence of her system, cohere with the rest of her system of beliefs. Therefore, the Sensation 
objection holds whether coherentism is truth-conducive or not.
Let us try to formulate the Sensation objection more clearly. The objection can be drawn out 
from the following two statements:
(CS) Coherentism: It is necessary and sufficient for any belief to cohere 
with the person's other beliefs in order for her to be justified in holding this 
belief.
(IE) The Independent Justification Thesis: A person is justified in holding 
some beliefs, grounded in experiences such as perception or introspection, 
regardless of whether they cohere with the person's other beliefs.
CS is a vauge statement of coherentism, and one which needs to be augmented later on. IE is a 
statement of the intuition underlying our introductory case with the headache. According to IE, 
whenever  we experience a headache we are also justified in holding the belief  that  we have a 
headache, regardless of whether this belief coheres with the rest of our beliefs or not.
The tension between CS and IE suggests two ways in which to state the Sensation objection. 
First, there is the case where a person holds a belief which is not justified to her because of IE, but 
which coheres with the rest of her beliefs. In this case, coherence is not sufficient for justification. 
Second, there is the case where a person is independently justified in holding a belief because of IE,  
but where this belief does not cohere with the rest of her beliefs. In this case, coherence is not 
necessary for justification. In both cases, coherentism fails to be either sufficient or necessary for 
justification.
Consider the first version of the objection. Suppose, as we did in the introduction to this paper,  
that having a headache is an experience which independently justifies some beliefs. And imagine a 
person, Mary, who holds a coherent system of beliefs supporting the belief that she does not have a 
headache, but who at the same time experiences an uncomfortable pain in her head. This argument 
against coherentism goes as follows:
Mary's Headache:
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(1-MH) If coherentism is true, then the following is true as well: If Mary's 
belief that she does not have a headache coheres with the rest of her beliefs, 
then Mary is justified in beliving that she does not have a headache (from 
CS).
(2-MH) Mary's belief that she does not have a headache coheres with the 
rest of her beliefs (assumption).
(3-MH): Therefore: If coherentism is true, then Mary is justified in believing 
she does not have a headache (from 1-MH and 2-MH).
(4-MH): But: Mary is justified in believing that she has a headache (from 
IE).
Therefore: Coherentism is false (from 3-MH and 4-MH).
In Mary's case, the coherence among her beliefs is not sufficient to justify her belief that she does 
not have a headache. The justification is defeated by her experience of a headache.
Let us move on to the second version of the objection. In this version, coherence is not even a 
necessary component of justification. The protagonist here is Thomas, who feels a painful sensation 
in his head, but who unlike Mary both believes that he has a headache and holds a system of beliefs 
sufficiently incoherent to not justify this belief. Consider then:
Thomas' Headache:
(1-TH) If coherentism is true, then the following is true as well: If Thomas' 
belief that he has a headache does not cohere with the rest of his beliefs, 
then Thomas is not justified in believing that he has a headache (from CS).
(2-TH): Thomas' belief that he has a headache does not cohere with the rest 
of his beliefs (assumption).
(3-TH): Therefore: If coherentism is true, then Thomas is not justified in 
believing that he has a headache (from 1-TH and 2-TH).
(4-TH): But: Thomas is justified in believing that he has a headache (from 
IE).
Therefore: Coherentism is false (from 3-TH and 4-TH).
The cases of Mary and Thomas neatly illustrate the Sensation objection. How can the coherentist 
reply?
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4.  PSYCHOLOGICAL REPLIES
One  way  to  counter  the  arguments  made  in  the  cases  of  Mary  and  Thomas  is  to  deny  the 
assumptions made in the second premises, that is, in 2-MH and 2-TH. Consider the incredulity felt 
when first encountering the case of Mary. How can Mary fail to believe that she has a headache, 
even as she vividly feels the throbbing pain in her head? This opens up for the psychological claim 
that cases such as Mary's are impossible. Certain experiences, we may argue, are such that they 
always intimate or bring about certain introspective beliefs.8 Since the experience of a headache 
always brings about the belief that one has a headache, Mary's situation is impossible. The case 
cannot constitute an objection to coherentism, since it was never a possible scenario to begin with.
There are  at  least  two objections to  this  kind of psychological  reply.  First,  we may wonder 
whether it is true. For consider what kind of impossibility is involved. Is Mary's belief in having a 
headache by necessity induced by her experience of a headache, such that there is no possible world 
in which she could have had this experience without believing that she has a headache? This seems 
too strong. There could be a number of exceptions to the idea that experiences always bring about 
certain beliefs. As Earl Conee has argued, the causal connection between our experiences and belief 
formation is likely of a much more contingent nature.9 The point is that we can always imagine 
some  hindrance  to  our  experiences  bringing  about  certain  beliefs,  perhaps  because  of  simple 
inattentiveness to those same experiences.
Of course,  a  watered  down impossibility  claim,  reduced to  a  less  strict  and more common-
sensical  notion,  might  fare  better.  It  may  very  well  be  true  that  most  people,  under  standard 
conditions, always form the belief in their having headaches whenever their heads hurt. Under this 
interpretation, the psychological claim is true. But then it no longer provides the coherentist with 
the resources she needs to respond to the case of Mary.
Second, the reply does not solve the case of Thomas. Thomas experiences and believes he has a 
headache, which is fully compatible with the idea that his experience of a headache always brings 
about this belief. However, since his system of beliefs is incoherent it cannot lend any justification 
to the belief that he has a headache, and so coherentism is unable to explain the justification of this 
belief – regardless of whether headache-beliefs are always induced by headache-experiences or not. 
Of course, we could attempt a similar psychological claim with respect to Thomas. We could 
claim that the experience of a headache not only brings about the belief that he has a headache, but 
8 See Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge”, 20; Conee, 
“Isolation and Beyond”, 140-1.
9 Conee, “Isolation and Beyond”, 141.
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also whatever coherent system of beliefs is necessary for supporting this belief. This makes Thomas 
case impossible. But it is also an implausible claim. What guarantee do we have that the experience 
of a headache brings about these other beliefs? Psychological replies to the objection therefore seem 
like non-starters.
5.  BACKGROUND BELIEFS
Another strategy is to rid ourselves of IE by rejecting that there is any  independent  justification 
going on in the case of Mary and Thomas. In that case, we want to show how 2-MH and 2-TH 
cannot be true at the same time as 4-MH and 4-TH. In other words, whenever the coherence of  
Mary's and Thomas' system of beliefs are as described in the second premises, there should be no 
independent justification going on as described in the fourth premises. This reply builds on a well-
known  response  available  to  the  coherentist,  and  which  was  hinted  at  in  the  reply  to  the 
foundationalist,  namely  that  our  beliefs  are  always  justified  against  a  system  of  supporting 
background beliefs. 
Let us start with a situation where the need to consider one's background beliefs is most clear, 
namely a case of perception. Suppose that you see an old friend on the street outside of your office 
window. Normally, this experience may seem to confer independent justification to your belief that 
your  friend  is,  indeed,  walking  past  your  office.  But,  the  coherentist  objects,  this  belief  is  so 
justified only given that you hold other beliefs as well, for example the belief that your perceptual 
faculties are reliable, that your friend doesn't have an identical twin living nearby, etc. And the 
absence of sceptical beliefs are required as well: if you believe that you are hooked up to some 
devious neuroscientist's mad experiment, true or not, then you are certainly not justified in believing 
anything at all about your friend walking past the window. 
Our experiences support widely different beliefs depending upon the structure of the rest of our 
system of beliefs. This becomes even clearer when considering the following example. Suppose you 
watch  a  straight  pin  partially  submersed  in  water.  Your  experience  of  this  pin  consists  of  a 
phenomenological impression which appears before your mind. On the basis of this impression, are 
you justified in believing that the pin is straight or crooked? It is impossible to tell, unless we also 
know more about your other beliefs. If Sarah knows about the law of refraction and believes that the 
pin is straight, and Tim knows nothing of such a law while at the same time believing that the pin is  
crooked,  then  both  are  equally  justified  in  their  beliefs.  This  distinguishes  justification  from 
knowledge – sometimes we are justified in believing that which is false, provided our total system 
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of beliefs is structured in a certain way. 
Memory beliefs are similar to perceptual beliefs in this regard. When recalling vivid images from 
our past, our beliefs concerning these images are justified relative to a body of background beliefs 
about, for example, other memory beliefs about that time, or the quality or reliability of our memory 
images or beliefs in general.
We might lend some additional support to this idea by considering the following question: how 
do we judge between which beliefs we are justified in holding, in the case where we have two 
similar but incompatible experiences? In this case, it seems plausible that whichever experience is 
defeated and consequently ignored is so on the basis of its lack of coherence with the rest of the 
person's system of beliefs, and that it in such a case no longer confers any justification to any of 
your  beliefs.  But  how  can  this  be  true,  if  such  experiences  are  meant  to  confer  justification 
independently  of  their  coherence  among  your  beliefs?  Should  they  not  confer  at  least  some 
justification  to  a  belief,  even  when its  incoherence  with  the  rest  of  one's  system of  beliefs  is 
apparent?
Let us return to those cases which are based upon introspection. Introspection could be seen as a 
kind of inner perception, where we examine our own experiences and inner states, such as feeling 
pleasure or pain. Is it not preposterous to claim that we must have a supporting body of beliefs in 
order for our introspective beliefs to be justified?
These are surely difficult questions, but an example might call this into doubt. Consider a person, 
call her Painless, who because of a rare disease to her nervous system has never felt any pain. One 
day, she is miracously cured and for the first time capable of feeling pain. Suppose now that she 
exclaims suddenly, "Ouch, my head hurts! This is what it is like to be in pain!". And suppose that 
she really feels what any other person would normally call pain. Because of Painless' causal history, 
it seems natural to ask whether she is really justified in believing she is in pain. For example, we 
want to know whether she properly excludes painless experiences such as mild skin irritations. Or 
suppose that Painless did not know she was cured. In that case, we would not criticise her for failing 
to believe that she has a headache. 
 If all of our beliefs depend upon a background of other beliefs for their justification, this means 
that for Mary and Thomas to be justified in believing that they have or do not have headaches, they 
must also have or lack the relevant background beliefs. For example, they must not believe that they 
are fooled in their sensory experiences, they must believe that certain experiences count as pain, etc. 
In other words, their beliefs about their headaches must cohere with a number of other background 
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beliefs. This observation suggests a way for the coherentist to reply to the Sensation objection. If 
the coherentist can make it plausible that it is the coherence between the introspective beliefs and 
the background beliefs, and not the experience, which confers justification, then IE falls, and the 
fourth premise goes with it. And there is one coherentist theory which promises to do just that,  
namely that proposed by Laurence BonJour.10 
6.  BONJOUR'S COHERENTISM
BonJour's theory is made up of the following parts:
(a)  Justification. BonJour's  provides  an account  of  how individual  beliefs  are  justified.11 An 
individual belief is justified when it is a member of a sufficiently large system of coherent beliefs 
belonging to the person.12 The coherentist justification is operating on two different levels. First, 
there is the global level where the whole system is justified on the basis of its coherence. Second,  
there  is  the  local  level  where  we  judge  whether  individual  beliefs  are  justified,  and  where 
justification is conferred to such a belief on the basis of its membership of the coherent system. 
Membership in a coherent system is acquired when the belief coheres with the rest of the beliefs in 
this system.
Here is another way of picturing it. Consider how justification is transmitted to an individual 
belief. For the foundationalist, justification is transmitted from other individual beliefs along with 
inferential  relations.  The  foundationalist  suppose  that  certain  other  beliefs  are  justified,  and 
conclude that a belief is justified by inferring it from these other beliefs. But to avoid the Regress 
problem,  the  foundationalist  had  to  stipulate  the  existence  of  basic  beliefs,  which  turned  out 
10 See BonJour's  The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,  87-188.  BonJour has later changed his mind and turned to 
foundationalism. For his recanting of coherentism, see his “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism”,  
The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Malden, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 
2004 [1999]),  117-42; and his “Toward a Defense of Empirical  Foundationalism”, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned  
Foundationalism, ed. Michael R. DePaul (Lanham, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2001), 21-38. 
11 BonJour,  The  Structure  of  Empirical  Knowledge,  89-93.  BonJour  himself  does  not  use  the  terminology  of 
justification being generated and transmitted,  but  I  find this way of stating his position better.  If  it  makes this  
account of coherentism differ from that of BonJour's, then I submit that the new version is an improvement. For an 
illuminating discussion, see Timothy Joseph Day, “Circularity, Non-Linear Justification and Holistic Coherentism”, 
The Current State of the Coherence Theory,  ed. John W. Bender (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989) 
134-41.
12 From this point onwards, I speak about beliefs being justified as a shorthand for a person being justified in holding a 
belief.
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troublesome. 
On the coherentist account, justification is not transmitted between individual beliefs, nor is it 
generated by any particular belief, basic or not. Justification is generated for the whole system on 
the basis  of its  coherence,  and is  only then conferred to  the individual  beliefs  on the basis  of 
whether these beliefs are members of the system: that is, on the basis of whether they cohere with  
the system as a whole.
(b) Coherence. BonJour supplies an account of coherence as the property of a whole system of 
beliefs, consisting in the following five conditions or "symptoms" of coherence:13
(1) A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent.
(2) A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic 
consistency.
(3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections.
(4) The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which 
it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to 
each other by inferential connections.
(5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the 
presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system.
As BonJour admits, this is only a sketchy and incomplete account of coherence, with additional 
details yet to be filled in. Also, it says nothing of what it means for an individual belief to cohere 
with a system of beliefs. In what follows, I presume that the individual belief's coherence with a 
system can be answered by an appeal to some similar account of coherence.
(c) Internalism. The most worrying part of BonJour's theory concerns its internalism. Since the 
following objection threatens to unravel his project before it even takes off the ground, it requires a 
somewhat longer treatment. Recall that according to internalism, the justification of a belief must be 
cognitively accessible to the believer herself. In other words, she must have access to the reasons 
for why her belief is so justified. For the coherentist, this plausibly means that the believer must 
have the appropriate metabeliefs about the coherence of her system, presumably the metabeliefs (a) 
that the belief to be justified coheres with a larger system of beliefs, and (b) that this system exhibits 
13 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 93-101.
13 (19)
the proper degree of coherence.
The problem is that this appears to reignite the Regress problem, since the metabeliefs must, it  
may seem, themselves be justified.14 And BonJour thinks that they cannot be justified by appeal to 
the coherence with the person's  system of beliefs since this,  according to him, would induce a 
vicious circle. The metabeliefs would in such a case be justified if and only if the metabeliefs are 
justified. 
BonJour tries to solve this problem by introducing what he calls the Doxastic Presumption.15 
This is a presumption to the effect that a person's grasp of her system of beliefs, which consists of 
her  metabeliefs,  is  always approximately correct.  But  why should we accept  this  presumption? 
BonJour suggests it is required for justification to get underway to begin with – unless we have a 
system of beliefs from which we can begin deciding justification, justification cannot get started in 
the first place. The problem is that the presumption makes the justification conditional: if, but only 
if, we accept the presumption that our metabeliefs are approximately correct, then certain particular 
beliefs can be justified. But if  we challenge this presumption,  then the coherentist has no clear 
answer  to  the  sceptic.  Introducing  the  Doxastic  Presumption  has  perhaps  stirred  up  the  most 
controversy regarding BonJour's coherentism, and he himself himself has conceded that the move 
now strikes him as "pretty desperate".16 
This is no place to undertake a wholesale study of BonJour's internalism. Still, it seems to me 
that the critique of this  position,  including that put  forth by BonJour himself,  is  at  least  partly 
misguided. In particular, it seems influenced by precisely the kind of non-holistic linear justification 
which the coherentist must reject. As I have already argued, and regardless of whether BonJour 
himself subscribes to this view, justification for a belief should not be seen as generated at the local 
level based on its coherence with other beliefs, nor as generated simply from its membership in the 
system.  Instead,  justification  is  generated  for  the  whole  system,  and  then  transmitted  to  its 
individual members. Since justification is never generated by or transmitted between beliefs, the 
metabeliefs  (a)  and (b)  need not  themselves  be  justified.  It  is  sufficient  that  they  are  actually 
believed by the person. 
14 See,  for  example,  Paul  K.  Moser's  “Internalism and  Coherentism –  A Dilemma”,  Analysis  48  (1988),  161-3; 
BonJour's “Reply to Moser”, Analysis 48 (1988), 164-5; and Moser's response in “How Not To Be A Coherentist”, 
Analysis 48  (1988),  166-7. Also,  see  Anthony  L.  Brueckner's  “Problems  With  Internalist  Coherentism”, 
Philosophical Studies 54 (1988), 153-60.
15 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Justification, 101-106.
16 BonJour,  “The  Dialectic  of  Foundationalism  and  Coherentism”,  126.  For  another  critique  of  the  Doxastic 
Presumption, see Hilary Kornblith, “How Internal Can You Get?”, Synthese 74 (1988), 313-27.
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To give an example, consider the justification of a particular belief B. It is, on the picture just 
sketched, not the case that metabeliefs generate or receive justification which is  then somehow 
transmitted to B. Rather, the metabeliefs are simply components which need to be in place for the 
system to generate and transmit the requisite justification to B. The metabeliefs functions here like 
the  crucial  parts  of  a  complex  machine.  As  long as  they  are  held  sincerely,  they  need not  be 
justified, nor true, in order for them to constitute part of the reasons for why B is justified. When a 
person justifies a belief, she does not try to find some metabeliefs to derive its justification from. 
Rather, she simply makes sure that the requisite metabeliefs are in place, and then has the system 
transmit justification to the beliefs in question.
So the justification of an individual belief is not threatened by unjustified metabeliefs. But what 
about the metabeliefs themselves? Is it not true that questions raised about the justification of these 
beliefs cannot be answered, so that a more moderate scepticism about the metabeliefs concerning 
the coherence of our system of beliefs can still go through?
I am inclined to reject this. The perceived threat stems once again from a non-holistic view of 
justification, where we look for other beliefs to justify the metabeliefs. It is not strange that this  
seems to induce a regress. But no such other beliefs are needed. The metabeliefs can be justified by 
their membership in the system, even as their presence, justified or not, is what makes this system 
generate justification. Once more, this is because the agent need not be justified in her reasons for 
why a particular belief is true: its perceived membership in a coherent system of beliefs is enough 
for its justification.
It is much easier to see how this works if we give up the metaphor of justification occuring in a 
circle, even a benevolent one. Coherentist justification does not occur in a linear fashion at all: not 
in a circle, an infinitely long line, or a line with some stopping point of basic beliefs. There is no 
bootstrapping going on here, since there is no "tugging" or "lifting up" of one belief by another. 
This  paints  a  very  different  picture  of  justification  from  foundationalist  accounts,  but  this  is 
precisely what  we should expect  from a competing theory hoping to relieve its  problems. The 
internalism of BonJour's theory is therefore, I believe, not in any danger. Whatever the flaws of 
coherentism, it is not in such a way incoherent or inconsistent.
(d) Observation and introspection. Finally, Laurence BonJour offers an account of coherentist 
observation and introspection.17 He suggests that there exist "spontaneous beliefs" which are not 
inferentially  arrived at, but which are still  justified by an appeal to the rest of our beliefs. These 
17 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 111-38.
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beliefs are arrived at and strikes us "in a manner which is both involuntary and quite coercive". 18 
They are in  this  sense psychologically  basic,  or  basic  in  their  origin,  even if  not  basic  in  any 
justificatory sense. On these grounds BonJour outlines a wholly internalist and coherentist account 
of  how observational  and  introspective  beliefs  are  justified,  which  takes  the  following  general 
form:19
Positive Observational/Introspective Justification:
(1-P) I have a cognitively spontaneous belief that P which is of kind K.
(2-P) Conditions C obtains.
(3-P) Cognitively spontaneous beliefs of kind K in conditions C are very 
likely to be true.
Therefore, my belief that P is very likely to be true.
Therefore, (probably) P.
And:
Negative Observational/Introspective Justification:
(1-N) I have no cognitively spontaneous belief that P of kind K.
(2-N) Conditions C' obtain.
(3-N) If it were true that P, then, if conditions C' are satisfied, it is very 
likely that I would have a cognitively spontaneous belief that P of kind K.
Therefore, it is very unlikely that the belief that P (if held) would be true.
Therefore, (probably) it is not the case that P.
This  is  a  wholly  coherentist  view  of  justification,  since  we  are  justified  in  accepting  our 
spontaneously held beliefs only when these cohere with our beliefs that the relevant background 
conditions  obtains  (2-P and 2-N)  and that  the  obtaining  of  these  conditions  implies  that  these 
spontaneous beliefs are true (3-P and 3-N).20
18 BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 117.
19 In the case of introspection, BonJour excludes the second premise, since he doubts this premise is necessary in such 
cases.  Since I have argued that  we can rightfully doubt whether  introspection is reliable,  I  have reinstated the  
premise. See BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 123-4 and 132-8.
20 BonJour's adds a so called “Observation Requirement” to his theory, which states that the system, in addition to 
being sufficiently coherent, must also receive adequate input from the outside world and ascribe a high degree of 
reliability to such input. It is this requirement that underlies BonJour's further claim that whenever such a system 
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7.  INSIDE THE HEADS OF MARY AND THOMAS
Out of the above schematics, we can show that the two versions of the Sensation objection, as 
suggested in the case of Mary and Thomas, fail. 
Let  us  start  with Mary.  For  Mary's  belief  that  she does  not  have a  headache to be justified 
according to coherentism, this belief must be connected to background beliefs as follows:
Mary's Introspection:
(1-MI) I have no cognitively spontaneous introspective belief that I have a 
headache.
(2-MI) I believe that the relevant background conditions are satisfied; that 
introspection occured under reliable conditions, and that I hold no sceptical 
beliefs to the contrary.
(3-MI) I believe that if it was true that I had a headache, then if the relevant 
background conditions are satisfied, it is very likely that I would have a 
cognitively spontaneous introspective belief that I have a headache.
Therefore, it is very unlikely that the belief that I had a headache (if held) 
would be true.
Therefore, (probably) it is not the case that I have a headache.
Recall that, for Mary's Headache to pose a counterexample to coherentism, both 2-MH and 4-MH 
must be true at the same time. That is, Mary's belief that she does not have a headache must cohere 
with the rest of her beliefs (premise 2-MH), and she must at the same time, presumably because of 
the justificatory powers of such experiences, be justified in believing that she has a headache (4-
MH). 
To see why the argument from Mary's Headache fails, let us consider a case where 2-MH is true,  
and where Mary's belief that she does not have a headache therefore coheres with the rest of her 
beliefs.  On  the  present  account  of  coherence,  this  means  that  Mary  believes  (2-MI)  that 
introspection was carried out under reliable conditions and that she holds no sceptical beliefs to the 
contrary, and (3-MI) that if she had a headache, and if the background conditions were satisfied, she 
remains  coherent  and  stable  over  time,  the  best  explanation  for  its  coherence  is  its  correspondence  to  reality. 
BonJour hopes this solution makes coherentism truth-conducive, at least in the long run. I leave aside these issues,  
both  because  adding  the  Observation  Requirement  takes  coherentism beyond  the  idea  that  coherence  is  both 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  justification,  but  also  since  I  am not  interested  in  whether  coherentism  is  truth-
conducive. The interested reader should consult BonJour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 141-4, 157-88.
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would spontaneously believe that she had a headache. But if she has both of these beliefs, it seems 
strange to say that she is justified in believing she has a headache. As a consequence, if 2-MH is 
true, then 4-MH is false, and so this version of the Sensation objection fails. 
Consider the following case of introspection, the premises which Thomas would have access to 
if (counter to what we have so far assumed) his belief that he had a headache cohered with the rest 
of his beliefs:
Thomas' Introspection:
(1-TI) I have a cognitively spontaneous introspective belief that I have a 
headache.
(2-TI) I believe that the relevant background conditions are satisfied; that 
introspection occurs under reliable conditions, and that I hold no sceptical 
beliefs to the contrary.
(3-TI) I believe that, whenever the relevant background conditions are 
satisfied, cognitively spontaneous introspective beliefs are very likely to be 
true.
Therefore, the belief that I have a headache is very likely to be true.
Therefore, I (probably) have a headache.
Remember that we stipulated that Thomas' system of beliefs was incoherent, and did not justify his 
belief that he had a headache. On the present account of coherence, this means that if 2-TH is  
correct, then at least one of the premises 1-TI, 2-TI or 3-TI must be false. (Had all the premises  
been true,  there would have existed a coherent set  of beliefs justifying his belief  that he has a 
headache.) And so, if we can show that whenever one of these premises are false, Thomas is not 
justified in believing he has a headache, then we have shown that 2-TH and 4-TH cannot be true at 
the same time, and that this version of the objection fails. 
Let us begin with 1-TI. We already know that Thomas believes himself to have a headache. What 
we do not know is if he believes that this belief is cognitively spontaneous. But then he must think 
that he has inferred this belief from some of his other beliefs, in which case 4-TH is clearly false. If 
Thomas does not believe that his belief in a headache is induced by his experience of a headache, 
but is rather just a product of his other beliefs, and if these other beliefs are incoherent enough not 
to support his belief that he has a headache, then he is surely not justified in holding this belief.
What if 2-TI is false? Then Thomas does not believe that the relevant background conditions are 
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satisfied.  For  example,  he  might  believe  that  he  is  fooled  by  some Cartesian  daemon,  or  that 
introspection occured under unreliable conditions. In this case, it seems doubtful that Thomas is 
justified in believing that he has a headache, and so 4-TH is false.
But what if 3-TI is false? In that case, Thomas believes that the relevant background conditions 
obtains, but he does not believe that whenever these conditions holds, the spontaneous belief that he 
has a headache is likely to be true. In this case, we may blame Thomas for all kinds of irrationality. 
We may think it highly strange how he can fail to see that this implication holds. But if he persists 
in this belief, it seems plausible to say that he is not justified in believing that he has a headache, 
and that once more, 4-TH is false. 
It therefore seems as if whenever 2-TH is true, 4-TH is false. Since both premises cannot be true 
at the same time, the second version of the Sensation objection fails as well.
8.  CONCLUSION
The Sensation objection holds that since certain beliefs induced by experiences, such as that of 
having a  headache,  are  justified  independently  of  their  coherence  with  the  rest  of  the  person's 
system of beliefs, coherentist theories of justification are false. Because these theories hold that 
coherence with one's system of beliefs is both necessary and sufficient for justification, they cannot 
account for any independent justification. In this paper, two versions of the objection, one in which 
coherence was insufficient and one in which it was not necessary for justification, were put forth. 
The coherentist was challenged to respond to these cases.
The  upshot  of  this  paper  is  that  the  Sensation  objection  fails.  There  is  no  independent 
justification  going  on in  these  cases,  since  all  justification  depends  on  coherence  with  certain 
background beliefs. It was further shown that BonJour's theory of coherentist introspection nicely 
accounts for this complexity. In particular, the justification of the belief that you have a headache 
depends  only  upon  your  belief  that  certain  background  conditions  hold,  for  example,  that 
introspection  has  occured  under  reliable  circumstances;  as  well  as  the  further  belief  that  the 
obtaining of these conditions makes the belief that you have a headache likely to be true. 
This does not prove that coherentism is the correct theory of justification, since other objections 
against it may still go through. But it does show that coherentism is less problematic than has been 
previously thought. We should therefore be wary of dismissing coherentism too quickly. Otherwise 
we might be left with a piecemal treatment where important philosophical work remains to be done,  
and where the supposed refutation is unfinished and, well, if I may say so, incoherent.
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